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INTRODUCTION
Not so long ago, the different sectors of the information industries-
telecommunications, computing, and entertainment-looked to different
models of legal regulation. But as these industries are increasingly related
to and converging with one another, lawyers need to take a broader look at
how the legal regimes that govern these industries relate to one another.' In
this Essay, I discuss how antitrust oversight can complement and work in
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law and Department of
Telecommunications. Thanks to Christina Burnett, Jonathan Feinberg, Ellen Goodman,
Merril Hirsh, Roy Hoffinger, Mark Lemley, Larry Malone, Gil Seinfeld, Steve Semeraro,
Brad Sonnenberg, John Thome, Phil Verveer, and Greg Werden for helpful comments and
encouragement.
1. This theme is one that I have developed elsewhere. See Philip J. Weiser, Law and
Information Platforms, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH. TECH. L. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Weiser, In-
formation Platforms].
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tandem with telecommunications regulation, particularly when it comes to
remedying anticompetitive conduct.
Within antitrust circles, there is almost a cottage industry of calling for
modesty in developing legal rules that regulate economic behavior. Given
that legal metaphors often expand far beyond their envisioned purpose,2
admonitions that highlight the limits of antitrust-as Judge Easterbrook
once put it-are entirely appropriate In the case of antitrust law, such
admonitions guard against overreaching applications of doctrines like the
essential facilities principle, which has supported the requirement that a
football team share its stadium has with a competitor 4 and that Western
Union provide support to a competitive teletype machine marketer who
wanted access to Western Union's customer lists.5 With respect to the role
of antitrust law in the telecommunications industry, however I am afraid
that we are moving well past the stage of correcting past excesses to erect-
ing unnecessary barriers to antitrust oversight. In particular, this Essay will
focus on the so-called Goldwasser doctrine.6
2. For a discussion of this point, see Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway
of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 404 (1986) ("Eventually, through repeated use, a metaphor
is likely to exhaust itself.").
3. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 21-23 (1984)
(discussing use of presumptions in antitrust law to screen out cases in which loss to con-
sumers and economy is likely outweighed by cost of inquiry and risk of deterring pro-
competitive behavior).
4. See Boudin, supra note 2, at 397 (discussing Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d
982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978), which held the stadium owner li-
able).
5. See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,
58 ANnTRUST L.J. 841, 843 (1989) (discussing Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987), which
overturned a district court's ruling against Western Union).
6. See Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing ap-
peal for lack of actionable antitrust claim). The basic thrust of my argument may also help
to explain the Federal Circuit's limitation of liability as to intellectual property holders. See
In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (barring antitrust
claim on the ground that it advanced a duty to deal in patented and copyrighted works); see
also Weiser, Information Platforms, supra note 1, at 15-22 (criticizing decision); Steven
Semeraro, Regulating Information Platforms: The Convergence to Antitrust, I J.
TELECOMM & HIGH TECH. L. 143, 149-171 (2002) (same); A. Douglas Melamed & Ali M.
Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts, Formalism, and the Intersection of Antitrust and In-
tellectual Property Law, 10 GEo. MASON L. REv. 407 (2002) (same).
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I. GOLDWASSER AND ANTITRUST MEEKNESS
The Telecommunications Act of 19967 (Telecom Act or 1996 Act) set
forth a new legal environment to facilitate competition in the telecommuni-
cations industry. In essence, it envisioned that, with certain legal mandates
in place, new entrants could compete against established monopoly incum-
bents in local telecommunications markets. Based on this premise, the Tel-
com Act provided that the local Bell Companies, which were prohibited
from offering long distance services under the AT&T consent decree, could
apply for entry into a state's long distance market once they established
that they had opened their local markets in that state to competition. 8 After
Ameritech applied unsuccessfully for long distance entry under the Act, a
number of consumers of its telecommunications services claimed that its
failure to comply fully with the Act's long distance entry requirements
violated the antitrust laws.9 Ultimately, the district court dismissed the
case, holding that "because of the potential for frustrating the goals of the
1996 Act, Plaintiffs should not be permitted standing to continue with its
claims in this case."' 0
When the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in the
Goldwasser case," it did not suggest that its decision launched a new doc-
trine. At bottom, Judge Diane Wood's opinion eschewed any reliance on
standing and imposed a sensible rule of pleading: if a plaintiff does not ex-
plain how actions taken by an incumbent local exchange carrier constitute
an abuse of its monopoly power in violation of the antitrust laws, the case
is for the regulatory authorities, not the antitrust courts. As Judge Wood
put it, any attempt to "equate a failure to comply with the 1996 Act with a
failure to comply with the antitrust laws" should be rejected outright by
antitrust courts.' 2 Conversely, this rule appeared to allow new entrants to
challenge any number of actions by incumbents-intentionally-caused
problems in interconnection, for example-as violations of the antitrust
laws even if those actions also happened to be subject to the regulatory
oversight of the Telecom Act.' 
3
7. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
8. See47U.S.C.§271.
9. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).
10. Id. at 10. The district court also rejected plaintiffs' request for damages as incon-
sistent with the filed rate doctrine set forth in Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S.
156 (1922). See id at 7.
11. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 390.
12. Id. at 400.
13. A number of entrants into the local telecommunications market have invoked anti-
trust law in actions against incumbent local exchange carriers. For a list of such cases, see
Pulver.com's Telecom Antitrust Intelligence Report, available at http://pulver.com/antitrust
2003)
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To be sure, the Sherman Act may not be an appropriate primary tool for
opening the local telephone market to competition, but it does provide an
important set of backstop remedies to supplement the Telecom Act's mar-
ket-opening measures.14 After All, both the Telecom Act's pro-competitive
purpose'5 and its antitrust savings clause 6 should leave no doubt that Con-
gress envisioned that antitrust law would play a role in opening up local
telephone markets to competition.'
7
The rule of pleading conception of Goldwasser is not the only viable un-
derstanding of that opinion. In fact, a number of courts have adopted a
much more aggressive reading: if the Telecom Act covers a specific anti-
trust claim, the antitrust claim should be dismissed. Picking up on dicta
from Goldwasser, a number of courts have concluded that "the Telecom-
report, see also Gail Lawyer, The Last Resort, XCHANGE MAG. (July 1, 2001), available at
http://www.xchangemag.com/articles/171 front.html (reporting on antitrust cases brought by
competitive local exchange carriers).
14. See Joel 1. Klein, The Race for Local Competition: A Long Distance Run, Not A
Sprint 6-7 (Nov. 5, 1997), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1268.htm (noting
that the antitrust remedies apply to local telecommunications markets, but that they "are not
well suited to serve as the first line method for opening the local market."). Randy Picker
elaborated on the point as follows:
As a matter of first principles, it is hard to understand why we could not apply both
the 1996 Telecommunications Act and the Sherman Act... Imagine access regu-
lations consisting of detailed statutory mandates coupled with general fill-in pow-
ers. We normally understand fill-in powers to reflect the considerable costs of
specifying ex ante rules that will apply to difficult-to-imagine future states of the
world. So we legislate in specifics for the things we understand now and build in
flexibility to address change in the future. This is a conventional way of describing
incomplete contracts written by private parties.
15. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 201 (1996) ("The [Federal Communications]
Commission should be carrying out the policies of the Communications Act, and the DOJ
should be carrying out the policies of the antitrust laws.").
16. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56 (1996) ("[N]othing in the Act or
in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair or supercede the
applicability of any antitrust laws."); see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 201 (1996)
(explaining clause "prevents affected parties from asserting that the [Act] impliedly pre-
empts other laws."); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476, 45,494 (Aug. 29, 1996) ("[N]othing in [the
FCC's] regulations is intended to limit the ability of persons to seek relief under the antitrust
laws.").
17. Some courts have found this rationale persuasive. See, e.g., Law Offices of Curtis
v. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Ail. Corp., 305, F.3d 89, 112 (2d Cir. 2002) ("To the contrary, if the
defendant's conduct did violate the antitrust laws, the fact that the regulatory commission
also condemned the conduct of the [incumbent telephone company] may indicate that the
purposes of the two schemes are in synch, reinforcing our conclusion that there is no 'plain
repugnancy' between the two statutes."), pet. for cert. filed, 71 USLW 3352 (Nov. 1, 2002);
Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1282 (11 Cir. 2002)
(merely pleading violations of the 1996 Act does not state a claim under the Sherman Act).
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munications Act is more specific legislation that takes precedence over the
general antitrust legislation."' 8 Although a number of other courts have
adopted the more narrow rule of pleading approach, quite a few have, how-
ever, dismissed antitrust claims based on an aggressive reading of Gold-
wasser, 19
At bottom, the aggressive reading of Goldwasser suggests an uneasy re-
lationship between antitrust law and telecommunications regulation. First,
it expresses some skepticism about the comparative value of antitrust in the
local telephone market-opening process spawned by the Telecom Act and
emphasizes the dictum, often taken out of context from Goldwasser, that
the "antitrust laws would add nothing to the oversight already available"
under the Telecom Act.20 Second, it maintains that imposing antitrust du-
ties in this context would be incompatible with the "elaborate system of
negotiated agreements and enforcement established by the [Telecom]
Act.
,2 1
In seeking to fit antitrust oversight within the model of the Telecom Act,
Goldwasser and its progeny correctly appreciate that "an industry's regu-
lated status is an important 'fact of market life"' that needs to be taken into
account in designing antitrust rules and remedies. 22  In previous cases,
where antitrust plaintiffs sought to facilitate competition in regulated in-
dustries, such as the Otter Tail and AT&T cases,23 the courts took actions
that enabled the plaintiffs to obtain relief that was consistent with the
regulatory regime. By contrast, the aggressive reading of Goldwasser sug-
gests that the Telecom Act occupies the field in ways that previous regula-
tory regimes did not and, as a result, there is no value added from antitrust
oversight.
18. MGC Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 146 F. Supp .2d 1344,
1352 (S.D. Fla. 2001); see also GoIdwasser, 222 F.3d at 401 (explaining that the Act im-
poses more specific obligations than the antitrust laws).
19. See Covad Communications Corp. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130
n.19 (D.D.C. 2002) (collecting cases). The alternative approach follows the course recom-
mended by the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal Communications
Commission. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States and the Federal Communications
Commission, Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. Bell South, Inc., No. 01-10224-JJ (Mar.
28, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ cases/f7700/7777.htm; see also, Trinko,
305 F.3d at 109-112 (following this approach).
20. 222F.3dat4Ol.
21. Id.
22. MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1105 (7th Cir.
1983) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
23. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (refusing to confer
antitrust immunity based on Federal Power Act); MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1101-
04 (denying AT&T implied immunity); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
2003]
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My evaluation of the relationship between antitrust oversight and regu-
lation suggests that there is an important value that antitrust can add to the
equation. In particular, the comparative advantage of antitrust in this con-
text parallels what it offered in both the AT&T and Otter Tail cases. In the
antitrust litigation against AT&T, the lack of effectiveness and speed with
which a regulatory agency could act vis-a-vis an antitrust court emerged as
a basic theme of the case. In the Otter Tail case, the Supreme Court under-
scored that an antitrust court could empower the Federal Power Commis-
sion to enforce pro-competitive actions that were .not authorized by, but
were consistent with, the Federal Power Act.24 Similarly, even under a pro-
competitive regime like the Telecom Act, antitrust courts can act in con-
junction with regulators to provide expeditious and effective remedies for
anticompetitive conduct.
Antitrust courts also possess advantages over regulatory agencies relat-
ing to the nature of a judicial forum. These advantages, such as broader
discovery, a wide scope of remedial authority, and freedom from political
interference, are not inherent advantages of courts over agencies; rather,
they reflect the current state of agency practice and structure. In theory,
then, regulatory agencies could be as effective as courts in dispute resolu-
tion, but the experience and practical advantages possessed by courts sug-
gest that they will be (for at least the foreseeable future) both more effec-
tive in adjudicating disputes as well as in spurring the parties to settle
complex cases.
With respect to the ability of antitrust courts to bring an issue to closure
more effectively than a regulatory agency, it is important to note that anti-
trust courts provide parties with an alternative forum in the event that
regulatory agencies have difficulty adapting to the new role of adjudicating
disputes and enforcing legal duties in an emergingly competitive environ-
ment. The Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy,
for example, recently decided a matter involving allegations of illegal and
anticompetitive cross-subsidization by Boston Edison over two and one
half years after the case stood submitted to the agency.25 Regardless of
24. See Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. at 375-78 (imposing an antitrust remedy on Otter
Tail Power Co.).
25. See Investigation by the Department of Telecommunications and Energy, on its
own motion, Into Boston Edison's Compliance with the Department's Order in D.P.U. 93-
37, D.P.U./D.T.E. 97/95 (Dec. 28, 2001), available at http://www.state.ma.us/dpu/electric
/97-95/1228finorder.pdf; see also Investigation into Boston Edison Company's (BECo)
compliance with the Department's Order in Boston Energy Company, D.P.U. 93-37 (1993);
BECo's investment in Boston Energy Technology Group (BETG), Order Opening Investi-
gation of BECo's Compliance with D.P.U. 93-37, D.P.U./D.T.E. 97-95 (1997). My expo-
sure to this proceeding comes from my work with Cablevision Systems Corp., an intervenor
in this matter.
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one's views of the outcome of the Microsoft case, the ability of an antitrust
court to expedite a case of that complexity and importance from complaint
to resolution on appeal in three years is an admirable achievement.2 6 To be
sure, not all antitrust courts will provide as effective a forum as did the Mi-
crosoft court nor will all regulatory agencies act with the lack of alacrity as
did the Massachusetts commission, but the availability of an antitrust rem-
edy provides an important safety valve for and a backstop to the regulatory
regime. In the AT&T case, the Federal Communications Commission was
particularly bad at keeping AT&T in line-two former Common Carrier
Bureau Chiefs testified that the agency could not do so27-but it need not
reach that extreme for antitrust oversight to provide a valuable pro-
competitive alternative to the regulatory agency.
In Otter Tail, the Supreme Court's willingness to order the wholesale
wheeling of power necessary to facilitate competition provided the Federal
Power Commission with the authority it did not enjoy as part of its statu-
tory mandate.28 One could argue, as the dissent did in that case, that such a
role for an antitrust court intrudes on the governing regulatory frame-
work.29 The majority, however, explained that the mere absence of author-
ity for a regulatory agency to take an action that would otherwise be man-
dated under antitrust law does not mean that the regulatory statute views
that act as repugnant to it.30 As for the Telecom Act, the ability of state and
federal regulators-both legally and practically-to enforce its pro-
competitive obligations remains uncertain. Consequently, it is quite plau-
31sible that the availability of antitrust remedies will prove very important.
The role of antitrust law, in a world where telecommunications regula-
tion facilitates competition, will generally be to supplement regulatory
26. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[lIt is note-
worthy that a case of this magnitude and complexity has proceeded from the filing of com-
plaints through trial to appellate decision in a mere three years.").
27. See STEPHEN COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY 373 (Collier Macmillan, Inc. 1986)
(describing testimony of former Common Carrier Bureau Chiefs Bernard Strassburg and
Walter Hinchman in the AT&T case); see also United States v. Western Electric Company,
Inc. & American Telephone & Telegraph Company; Competitive Impact Statement in Con-
nection with Proposed Modification of Final Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7180 (Feb. 17,
1982) (noting that the relief obtained in the case imposed equal access standards on the local
network in "greater detail" and effectiveness than had the regulatory authorities).
28. Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. at 375-76 (concluding that Federal Power Act did not
authorized wheeling mandate, but holding that antitrust remedy could do so).
29. Id at 389-90 (stating that the court's reasoning was "at odds with the congressional
purpose in specifying the conditions under which interconnections can be required.").
30. Id. at 372.
31. See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the En-
forcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001) (discussing how the Telecom
Act's enforcement mechanisms should work).
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sanctions, not to second-guess regulatory requirements on the scope of
dealing. At present, there are a number of regulatory failings with respect
to enforcement, including limits on the authority of regulatory agencies to
impose monetary damages and a hesitancy to grant (and inexperience with)
preliminary relief. Thus, for areas where an antitrust duty to deal also is
regulated by telecommunications law, it is quite likely that the relief af-
forded by the regulatory authorities will be less than that available from
antitrust courts. Unfortunately, an aggressive reading of Goldwasser leads
courts to dismiss any antitrust claim that is potentially governed by tele-
communications law-inserting, in effect, an exhaustion of remedies re-
quirement into antitrust law.32 The courts adjudicating the antitrust litiga-
tion against AT&T also could have adopted such an approach, as the FCC
possessed the authority to mandate interconnection, but they wisely de-
clined to do so.
33
Some of the same forces that previously led to judicial shortcuts such as
an unfortunate overuse of per se rules and a less than careful application of
legal metaphors may well account for a judicial eagerness to use Gold-
wasser as a bar to antitrust scrutiny. As Judge Boudin put it in explaining
the overextension of certain antitrust metaphors: "antitrust law is hard and
courts often look for simplifying doctrines, be they metaphors, per se rules,
or easy exits that avoid more difficult factual and analytical inquiries., 34 To
avoid the temptation of adopting an easy shortcut that would cut off liabil-
ity for firms regulated by telecommunications law, courts should heed the
admonition that "[w]hen the adverse effect of allowing a monopolist to
maintain certain practices is clear, a court should stay its hand rarely, if
ever." 35 Admittedly, there are certain exceptions where antitrust courts
should withhold relief, but the courts that have adopted an aggressive
reading of Goldwasser have not explained why those cases fit within such
exceptions. To understand which cases fall within the exceptions to the
32. See Covad Communications Co. v. Bell At. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 134
(D.D.C. 2002) (insisting on a regulatory determination "as an initial matter at least" of inter-
connection agreement requirements before allowing an antitrust claim to proceed).
33. See, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1102-03 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that "FCC's regulatory authority under the Communi-
cations Act does not preclude application of the Sherman Act.") (citation omitted).
34. See Boudin, supra note 2, at 403. Judge Boudin elaborated on this phenomenon as
follows:
Antitrust law is a difficult subject, and the underlying economics are even more baf-
fling to most judges and lawyers. An understandable impulse to simplify antitrust
law is reflected in many places, including per se rules, cost tests for predatory pricing,
and mathematical formulas for determining undue concentration or monopoly power.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 864 n.57 (6th Cir. 1980).
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general rule, Part 11 explains how regulation and antitrust oversight should
fit together.
II. BACK TO BASICS AND THE TOWNOF CONCORD
To understand how antitrust and regulation should coexist, a natural
place to begin is by examining Goldwasser's cousin, then-Chief Judge
(now-Justice) Breyer's opinion in the Town of Concord case.36 The plain-
tiff in that case, unlike in Goldwasser, pled its complaint in antitrust
terms.37 In particular, the Town of Concord claimed that Boston Edison,
even though its prices were regulated at both the wholesale and retail level,
had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by engaging in a price
squeeze.38 In rejecting this claim, Justice Breyer analyzed carefully the pit-
falls of antitrust oversight over utility prices that were approved by a com-
petent regulatory authority.39 Unlike the aggressive interpretation of Gold-
wasser, Justice Breyer's Town of Concord, opinion provides an exemplary
exposition of the relationship between antitrust and regulation. The general
rule, as Breyer recognized, is that antitrust oversight is proper.40 Nonethe-
less, the opinion determined that where a firm raises a price squeeze claim
arising from a context where the wholesale and retail markets are both
regulated, there are strong reasons for doubting the comparative advantage
of antitrust oversight over price regulation.4'
Under the Town of Concord model, there are three types of cases in-
volving regulated entities where antitrust law should refrain from providing
relief. First, and most classically, there may be some cases where, as then-
Judge (now-Justice) Kennedy put it, granting relief would impinge on the
regulatory agency's "freedom of action to carry out its regulatory mission"
or require the regulated entity to "act with reference to inconsistent stan-
dards of conduct. 4 2 In those limited cases where antitrust oversight would
lead to outcomes different then those mandated by the regulatory regime,
36. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
37. See id. at 20.
38. See id. at 21.
39. See id. at 23.
40. See id. at 41.
41. See id. at 22-23.
42. Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 732 (9th Cir. 1981). This
was the model adopted by Judge Greene, who concluded that: "It presumably follows that,
unless defendants are able to demonstrate that they were precluded by the FCC (acting un-
der Communications Act standards) from interconnecting, they had an obligation to inter-
connect if failure to do so was anticompetitive under the Sherman Act." United States v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 336, 1359 n.100 (D.D.C. 1981) (alteration in original).
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antitrust law should yield to regulation.43 Second, some claims may not
present proper concerns for antitrust courts. In a private antitrust action
against AT&T case, for example, the Seventh Circuit rejected MCI's
claims that the antitrust laws mandated a duty for AT&T to resell its long
haul network as a duty to deal obligation on a non-essential facility,44 but
did hold AT&T liable for refusing to interconnect MCI's network to its
own. Finally, as in Town of Concord, there are cases that, from the stand-
point of an antitrust court, are irremedial because they would require cer-
tain judgments-particularly those involving price-setting-that are outside
the competence of antitrust courts and within the core province of regula-
tory agencies.
The significance of the Town of Concord model is that it will focus anti-
trust courts on where they can further the pro-competitive goals of the
Telecom Act. In some rare cases, this model will suggest withholding re-
lief where antitrust courts are asked to sort through the competitive impact
of regulated pricing.45 More significantly, this model will provide a forum
for antitrust courts to oversee the most competitively significant duties im-
posed by the Telecom Act, such as interconnection and other areas where a
local incumbent provider "refuses to cooperate with a competitor in cir-
cumstances where some cooperation is indispensable to effective competi-
tion.''46 In theory, regulatory agencies should focus on such issues with the
utmost urgency and concern, but in practice, it is important that to the ex-
tent that the agencies cannot enforce or under-enforce such obligations, an-
titrust courts are there to pick up the slack.47 Thus, as the litigation against
43. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., Washington Redskins, 518 U.S. 231, 250
(1996) (holding that antitrust oversight in area governed by labor law was improper).
44. See MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1149.
Judge Greene rejected a similar request in the context of the AT&T consent decree. See
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 604 F. Supp. 316, 324 (D.D.C. 1985) ("The purpose
of the decree ... is not the artificial creation of competition by enabling [alternative] inter-
exchange carriers to share AT&T's interexchange capabilities and facilities.").
45. Such cases also might be immune from antitrust liability under the tariffed rate
doctrine, which holds that a "filed rate"-i.e., one approved by a regulatory agency-cannot
be challenged in an antitrust suit. See, e.g., Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co.,
23 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd in relevant part, 202 F.3d 408, 422 (1st Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 818 (2000) (refusing to grant immunity form antitrust law pur-
suant to the filed rate doctrine to a wholesale power provider); see also Keogh v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 56 (1922) (setting out the scope of the filed rate doctrine). But see Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-76 (1973).
46. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).
47. See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell At. Corp., 305 F.3d at 112
("While ideally, the regulatory process alone would be enough to bring competition to the
local phone service markets, it is possible that the antitrust laws will be needed to supple-
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AT&T recognized the mere fact that the regulatory agency possesses the
authority-or even the duty-to consider enforcing an interconnection re-
quirement does not displace the role of antitrust law in ensuring that a party
acts in good faith to interconnect with its rivals.
48
The problem with some of the post-Goldwasser cases is that they trans-
form the three exceptions listed above into a general rule. Of the three ex-
ceptions, the concern regarding remedies is the most compelling and merits
close attention. In particular, the aggressive reading of Goldwasser appears
to rely on the theory that, assuming that the Telecom Act's remedial
scheme works perfectly, there will be no need for antitrust oversight in the
telecommunications arena. Alternatively, one might argue that, even if an-
titrust courts could eventually supplement the pro-competitive efforts of the
Telecom Act, they should withhold relief until the nature of the Act's re-
medial scheme is fleshed out more fully and/or proven inadequate to deter
and address anticompetitive conduct. Either one of these justifications for
the aggressive reading of Goldwasser fails to counter the argument that an
appropriately implemented remedial strategy (as outlined in Part III) does
not substitute for regulatory oversight, but provides a role for antitrust as a
means to either empower the relevant regulatory agency and/or keep the it
honest where it has failed to act effectively. Moreover, the essence of this
argument against antitrust oversight would also justify withholding relief
where tort actions could redress the conduct at issue, but antitrust courts
regularly reject this line of argument. 9
Before moving on to discuss the challenges of remedying antitrust vio-
lations in the context of local telecommunications markets, it is important
to acknowledge that the legal uncertainty involving refusal to deal cases
may well underlie the aggressive reading of Goldwasser. Both the Aspen
case and the essential facilities cases illustrate this point, because they do
not provide a clearly defined standard for antitrust liability.50 Stated most
basically, Aspen held illegal an effort by a firm with market power to raise
its rivals' costs through actions that were economically irrational (i.e., did
ment the regulatory scheme."); see also MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1102 (relying on
antitrust laws used to supplement regulatory remedies).
48. This is the mistake made by many courts that adopt the aggressive interpretation of
Goldwasser. See, e.g., Covad Communications Co. v. Bell At. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123,
133 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that the remedial schemes established by antitrust law and
the Telecom Act are "fundamentally incompatible"), for an example of this mistake.
49. See, e.g., Conwood Co., L.P. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783-84
(6th Cir. 2002) (antitrust liability proper, even where actions at issue also redressable under
tort law), cert. denied, 2003 WL 102537 (Jan. 13, 2003).
50. See Kenneth L. Glazer & Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Unilateral Refusals to Deal Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 759 (1995) (discussing the ambiguous
nature of the essential facilities).
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not have any efficiency justification), but for their exclusionary effect.5'
This general formulation does not, however, provide for a clearly defined
judicial inquiry and Aspen may raise more questions than it answers.
2
Similar to the criticisms that Aspen failed to define clearly what type of
conduct gives rise to liability, the essential facilities doctrine also remains
open to substantial criticism, most notably Professor Areeda's judgment
that it is "less a doctrine than an epithet."53  Even though the Supreme
Court has declined to set forth explicitly the scope or nature of an essential
facilities doctrine, Section 2's core prohibition on exclusionary conduct
extends to denials of necessary cooperation like interconnection or in the
switching of customers from the incumbent to a rival whether or not
framed under the heading of "essential facilities. 54 What is worth noting
51. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.19
(1985) (acknowledging antitrust laws prevent competitors from "exclud[ing] rivals on some
basis other than efficiency."); see also Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
125 F.3d 1195, 1209 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits a monopo-
list's unilateral action, like Kodak's refusal to deal, if that conduct harms the competitive
process in the absence of a legitimate business justification."), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094
(1998); Olympia Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1986) (Pos-
ner, J.) ("The monopoly supplier who retaliates against customers who have the temerity to
compete with him, by cutting such customers off, is severing a collateral relationship in or-
der to discourage competition."). In a well developed explanation of what constitutes
"predatory" or "exclusionary" conduct, the D.C. Circuit explained that:
[P]redation involves aggression against business rivals through the use of business
practices that would not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation
that (1) actual rivals will be driven from the market, or the entry of potential rivals
blocked or delayed, so that the predator will gain or retain a market share sufficient to
command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon
competitive behavior the predator finds threatening to its realization of monopoly
profits.
Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
52. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and
Refusal to Deal- Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 659 (2001)
(criticizing Aspen). One area of antitrust law where Aspen may have provided some clarity
is in dispelling a myth about the so-called category of "intent cases" under Section 2 (often
distinguished from the "essential facility" cases). See Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609
F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting the distinction). In particular, this label implied that
proving an intent to exclude a competitor from the market was either a necessary or suffi-
cient condition to establish liability under Section 2. As Aspen makes clear, the appropriate
inquiry is into the exclusionary effect of the conduct at issue and "evidence of intent is
merely relevant to the question of whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as
'exclusionary."' Aspen, 472 U.S. at 602; see also Olympia Equip. Leasing Co., 797 F.2d at
379-80 (asserting that "if conduct is not objectively anticompetitive the facts that it was mo-
tivated by hostility to competitors is irrelevant").
53. Areeda, supra note 5, at 841 (1989).
54. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Technical Images Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83
(1992) (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)) (rivals are not permit-
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about some of the skepticism expressed about the viability of the essential
facilities doctrine is the crucial insight that no access right demanded by
competitors should be granted if that right would, if granted ex ante, have
led the owner of the facility (real or virtual, as in the case of a network of
subscribers) not to build the facilities in the first place or would otherwise
impair its use.55 Even with this limiting principle, however, I suspect that
courts will increasingly confront bona fide access right claims under the
antitrust laws.56 Thus, the proper response to criticisms of Aspen or the es-
sential facilities principle is to apply those doctrines in a more limited and
careful fashion, not to create categorical exemptions to them.
In sum, it is critical that the Goldwasser doctrine not expand to provide
that antitrust scrutiny does not apply to incumbent local exchange carriers
because of a prediction that only few meritorious claims could be brought
in the context of the local market opening effort of the Telecom Act. First,
any insistence on a general rule barring antitrust liability contradicts the
longstanding antitrust principle that per se rules-either endorsing the ille-
gality or legality of a particular practice (or set of practices)-should only
be instituted after longstanding experience demonstrates the competitive
significance and effect of the conduct at issue.57 This logic tracks the ar-
gument that barring antitrust claims in the intellectual property context
would elevate a formal and categorical rule above a careful, factual inquiry
ted to take actions designed solely "to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advan-
tage, or to destroy a competitor"); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 596 n.19 (1985) (antitrust laws prevent competitors from "exclud[ing] rivals on
some basis other than efficiency."); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183-84 (1st Cir. 1994) ("It is not entirely clear whether the Court in
Aspen Skiing intended to create a category of refusal-to-deal cases different from the essen-
tial facilities category or whether the Court was inviting the application of more general
principles of antitrust analysis to unilateral refusals to deal.").
55. See Areeda, supra note 5, at 851 (forced sharing of facilities may discourage the
building of such facilities in the first place, which would leave consumers worse off).
56. See Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons From
the Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 97 (2001) (explaining how network effects can,
under certain circumstances, entrench a monopolist by raising barriers to entry); cf Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring)
("Lotus has already reaped a substantial reward for being first; assuming that the Borland
program is now better, good reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus customers to take
advantage of a new advance, and to reward Borland in turn for making a better product.").
57. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) ("But we do
make clear that departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstra-
ble economic effect rather than... formalistic line drawing."); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (announcing rule that "there are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use").
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that is sensitive to economic realities. 58 Second, for cases like Goldwasser
where the plaintiffs raise claims that clearly do not rise to a level of com-
petitive significance to trigger antitrust liability, courts can and should dis-
miss those claims-either for failure to state a claim or at the summary
judgment stage-without any great costs to the defendant or the legal sys-
tem.59 But where there are plausible claims of exclusionary conduct with
real anticompetitive effects, courts should examine the facts at issue rather
than rely on a categorical rule to end their inquiry. 60 As courts confront
these claims, they will be forced to consider what types of remedies are ap-
propriate where a plaintiff establishes antitrust liability under Section 2 (or
under Section 1) of the Sherman Act. Part III proceeds to examine this
question, reflecting on alternative remedial strategies.
III. IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MODEL
Antitrust law, as a common law-like regime, has long recognized that
the scope of liability must be related to the availability of a suitable rem-
edy. In criticizing the essential facilities doctrine, Professor Areeda argued
that antitrust claims should be "deemed irremedial" in cases where "com-
pulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls char-
acteristic of a regulatory agency."6' Similarly, as Professor Turner argued
in regard to conscious parallelism and tacit collusion as practiced by oli-
gopolists, the antitrust laws should withhold a right of action to address
such conduct as they cannot provide any meaningful remedy to end such
conduct.62 (Recognizing that antitrust law has its limits, regulators occa-
sionally have stepped in to institute proactive measures-with mixed re-
sults-to eliminate allegedly abusive practices.63) These criticisms against
58. See Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 6, at 425-26 (noting antitrust law's
hesitance to adopt formal, categorical rules).
59. Given pleading rules and ordinary practice, dismissals at the motion to dismiss - as
opposed to the summary judgment stage - should be rare. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957) (stating that motion to dismiss should be granted only when "it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief').
60. See Steven Semeraro, The Antitrust Telecom Connection, SAN DIEGO L. REv.
(forthcoming 2003) (discussing the nature of the appropriate inquiry).
61. Areeda, supra note 5, at 853; see Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 864
(6th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he difficulty of setting a price at which the monopolist must deal might
well justify withholding relief altogether.").
62. See Donald F. Turner, The Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act: Con-
scious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 671 (1962).
63. Compare United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir.
1985) (Posner, J.) (upholding regulation of airlines to address, among other things, practices
with respect to the operation of computerized reservation systems) with Schurz Communi-
[55:1
REFLECTIONS ONANTITRUST REMEDIES
antitrust actions, rather than suggesting that antitrust should withhold relief
in cases involving claims against incumbent local telephone companies,
actually point the way to a solution.
Both Professor Areeda's and Goldwasser's concern regarding the impo-
sition of antitrust duties based on Section 2 of the Sherman Act can be un-
derstood as focused not on the scope of liability as such, but rather on the
possibility that antitrust remedies for such duties would mire courts in su-
pervisory roles for which they are ill-suited. The short answer to this con-
cern is that antitrust courts can and should craft remedies that are not only
sensitive to, but may well rely on the presence of an existing regulatory re-
gime.64 The longer answer is that there are four alternate approaches that
would enable an antitrust court to provide meaningful relief without un-
dertaking the role of a regulatory agency.65 In particular, courts can rely
on: (1) an arrangement or industry custom regulated by a regulatory
agency; (2) an existing access arrangements provided to other competitors;
(3) a prior course of dealing; or (4) a non-discrimination standard whereby
a company gives its competitor access to a facility on the same terms and
conditions as it gives itself or a preferred customer. The first three of these
access rights find support in the Supreme Court's seminal cases on the
subject-Terminal Railroad, Otter Tail, and Aspen-and the last one in-
volves a familiar antitrust principle, which was employed, for example, in
the AT&T consent decree. Within the telecommunications context, the
first of these remedial options will almost always be preferable, but the
others may be valuable in certain contexts. I will address each in turn.
cations, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1057, 1059-60 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (rejecting regula-
tion of television network's entry into production as unjustified).
64. Justice Breyer's Town of Concord opinion supports this approach, underscoring
that "where regulatory and antitrust regimes coexist, antitrust analysis must sensitively rec-
ognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to
which it applies." Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)
(internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. at 381
(counseling sensitivity to the regulatory regime in fashioning antitrust remedies); Law Of-
fices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d at 113 ("[C]ourts must be both
mindful and wary of the strong possibility that injunctive relief could have the unintended
consequence of disrupting the regulatory scheme... [and should] exercise their discretion
with restraint in any case where such relief is appropriate, consistent with respect for the
overarching regulatory regime that Congress has created.").
65. In addition to these four approaches, antitrust courts can also impose monetary
damages either based on actual economic harm or through a "sin no more" decree that
would trigger fines for acting in contempt of court. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft,
231 F.Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (instituting an injunction that includes a set of require-
ments that are backed by threats of contempt sanctions).
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A. Relying on a Regulated Input: The Otter Tail Case
Antitrust remedies in the context of regulated industries provide courts
with a unique opportunity to award pro-competitive relief without under-
taking the responsibilities of superintending the remedy itself. In the Otter
Tail case,66 for example, the Supreme Court made clear that the presence of
a regulatory agency was key to the award of injunctive relief. That case in-
volved an electric utility's effort to prevent municipalities in its region from
competing with it at the retail level by refusing to sell power at wholesale
rates or to wheel power from other wholesalers. Notably, the judicially or-
dered remedy of mandatory wheeling was not one authorized by the Fed-
eral Power Act itself, although the agency presumably enjoyed the compe-
tence to enforce such a remedy.67 The brilliance of imposing this remedy
and leaving it to the agency to administer it was that the regulatory com-
mission, although not authorized to mandate this pro-competitive remedy
itself, could evaluate and enforce a tariff-and reject it if it was unreason-
able-if the regulated utility decided to file one or an antitrust court di-
rected it to do so.
The model employed in Otter Tail provides an ideal approach for anti-
trust courts to wade into cases arising in regulated industries and award re-
lief without becoming mired in the day-to-day administration of a conduct
remedy that a regulatory agency can better monitor. Like in Otter Tail, an-
titrust litigation within the context of local telephone markets provides the
opportunity for parties to seek relief that may not presently be available,
but that, if granted, could be enforced by the regulatory agency and not the
court.68 The converse of this point is that regulatory agencies should be
mindful of antitrust concerns and regulate access arrangements with an eye
to potential antitrust litigation. Significantly, this approach will require an-
titrust courts and regulators to adjust to a different mindset from times past
when it was safe to say that the goal of regulation was to address market
power concerns directly while antitrust sought to do so indirectly by facili-
tating competition.
69
The Otter Tail model of relief encompasses the analytically distinct
components of defining the terms of access and remedying a violation of
66. Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. at 366.
67. See id. at 373.
68. See id. at 375.
69. As then-Judge Breyer put it, "[e]conomic regulators seek to achieve [the goals of
low prices, innovation, and efficient production methods] directly by controlling prices
through rules and regulation; antitrust seeks to achieve them indirectly by promoting and
preserving a [competitive] process that tends to bring [these goals] about." Town of Con-
cord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 930
(1991).
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the requisite terms. In some areas, as was the case in Otter Tail, where the
terms of dealing need to be defined and overseen, antitrust courts should
generally defer to the regulatory agency on the administration of access ar-
rangements. 70 In other cases, including ones where the agency has de-
fined-or defines pursuant to an antitrust decree-the terms of dealing,
there may still be room for antitrust remedies. Put differently, where the
question is not the terms of access, but the consequences for failing to pro-
vide such access, antitrust law may be able to provide additional remedies,
including preliminary relief and monetary damages, to what the regulatory
regime can provide.
The reluctance of antitrust courts to enter the business of supervising ac-
cess governed by telecommunications regulation is quite sound, but the
presence of regulatory agencies to define the terms of access can simplify
the role of antitrust courts. To be sure, antitrust courts should not seek to
enforce all of the Telecom Act's market opening obligations. Nonetheless,
where there is a duty to deal on an area that is "indispensable to effective
competition," a systematic violation of a particular duty - if it has exclu-
sionary effects - can give rise to a viable antitrust claim.71 If, for example,
an incumbent local telephone provider agreed to use certain procedures for
switching customers to a rival's network, but the incumbent provider will-
fully and systematically failed to follow those procedures so as to substan-
tially impair the entrant's ability to compete, this practice might violate the
antitrust laws as well as the Telecom Act.72 Similarly, if an incumbent
provider caused customers to experience unnecessarily high rates of
blocked calls (i.e., busy signals) after they switched to a competitor,
thereby deterring other customers from switching service, that practice
would also warrant antitrust scrutiny. In cases such as these, courts should
generally follow the Otter Tail model by leaving it to the regulatory agency
to define and enforce the precise terms on which the parties must deal, un-
dertaking for itself only the role of evaluating whether the conduct gives
rise to antitrust liability and assessing appropriate monetary damages.
70. This is the argument developed in Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of
The Essential Facilities Doctrine, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 433, 473-74 (1987).
71. Olympia, 797 F.3d at 379.
72. See N.E. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 94 (2d Cir. 1981) (arguing
that the use of an interconnection arrangement that imposed "a significant and probably un-
necessary disadvantage" stated an antitrust claim).
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B. Mandating a Wider Provisioning of an Existing Access Right:
The Case of the Terminal Railroad
In the Terminal Railroad case, the Supreme Court confronted a situation
where an access arrangement existed, but only for certain parties.73 Al-
though Terminal Railroad arose under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
involved a number of parties to an access arrangement, this case is signifi-
cant in that it essentially invented the concept of an access right based on
the antitrust laws. In that case, the United States requested the dissolution
of the Terminal Railroad Association on the ground that the Association's
control of the gateways into St. Louis unreasonably restrained trade. The
Court properly noted that it was not the joint ownership of the facility per
se that violated the antitrust laws, but rather that the discriminatory access
arrangements disadvantaged those who were not participants in the Asso-
ciation. Thus, the Court offered the Association a choice: either allow
other companies to join the association and enable non-participants to use
the facilities on just and reasonable terms or dissolve the Association
(which brought together three separate facilities). In outlining the former
remedy, the Court made clear that access to the bottleneck facility must be
provided "upon such just and reasonable terms and regulations as will, in
respect of use, character and cost of service, place every such company
upon as nearly an equal plane as may be with respect to expenses and
charges as that occupied by the proprietary companies. 74 The Association
took that course. In a later appeal, the Supreme Court explained that it
would not get dragged into some of the finer points about the rates charged
by the Association-namely, whether it could charge differential rates on
the east and wide side; instead, it stressed that rate setting is a legislative
function and that the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to
oversee the association's rate structure." In so doing, the court followed
the same model discussed above and used in Otter Tail.
C. Relying on a Prior Course of Dealing: The Aspen Skiing Case
The Aspen case presents yet another model for developing a judi-
cially manageable remedy. To be precise, Aspen does not provide a direct
precedent for enjoining conduct on the basis of a prior course of dealing
because it did not actually involve an award of injunctive relief. Nonethe-
less, the treble damages verdict in that case served as an instruction to the
same effect. Unfortunately, this remedy may be insufficient in markets that
73. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383,411 (1912).
74. Id
75. See Terminal R.R. of St. Louis v. United States, 266 U.S. 17, 30-31 (1924).
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move very quickly, as yesterday's terms of access may be insufficient to
enable a company to remain a viable competitor today.
The challenge of the prior course of dealing concept in high technology
industries, as is evident from the remedial proceedings in the Microsoft
case, is to determine what baseline is an appropriate one to codify in an an-
titrust decree. In Microsoft, for example, the federal government and Mi-
crosoft agreed to regulate older versions of the Windows operating system,
but the litigating States maintained that Microsoft should also be required
to make available a modular version of the operating system-i.e., without
"middleware" technologies previously not included in the prior version of
the system. 76 In making this argument, the litigating states invoked a ver-
sion of the prior course of dealing concept by arguing that Microsoft actu-
ally provides such a version to certain customers.
77
Finally, it is important to highlight two cautionary considerations for
courts evaluating a remedy that would require a continuation of a prior
course of dealing. First, courts should appreciate that such a remedy levies
a tax on a firm's prior willingness to deal (by punishing its subsequent
change) and thus might deter valuable experimentation in future business
strategies.78 Second, courts should recognize that the benefit of this model
is to avoid placing themselves in the role of overseeing day-to-day relations
between the affected companies.79 In theory, relying on a prior course of
dealing provides a baseline for rules and remedies that are easy to admin-
ister and will avoid placing an antitrust court in the role of constantly
76. See Nicholas Kulish, Ballmer Says Windows Rests on Ruling, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5,
2002, at B6 (discussing this dispute).
77. See See Joe Wilcox, States Missed A Break In Microsoft Trial, CNET News.com
(May 13, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-912128.html (explaining argument that
Windows XP Embedded, which was designed to run devices with embedded processors,
proves that middleware can safely be removed).
78. As Judge Posner put it:
Since Western Union had no duty to encourage the entry of new firms into the
equipment market, the law would be perverse if it made Western Union's encourag-
ing gestures the fulcrum of an antitrust violation. Then no firm would dare to attempt
a graceful exit from a market in which it was a major seller.
Olympia Equip. Leasing v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379-80 (7th Cir. 1986). In As-
pen, the Court may have doubted that it was imposing such a tax because, in areas where ski
slopes competed with one another, the defendant in that case actually behaved in the manner
sought by the plaintiff. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 603 n.30. In many cases, however,
such a benchmark may not be available, making such a judgment more difficult.
79. Another area of antitrust law that endeavors to follow this caution is the techno-
logical tying doctrine. Similar to the prior course of dealing concept used here, that area of
the law can look to whether competitors also use the approach in question. See M. Sean
Royall, Coping With The Antitrust Risks of Technological Integration, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
1023, 1056 (2001) (discussing issue).
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regulating a business, but courts should be careful to ensure that this ap-
proach works in a minimally intrusive fashion in practice.80
D. The Non-Discrimination Model: The AT&T and Kodak Cases
To account for a degree of dynamism in an industry, courts sometimes
impose a non-discrimination requirement that sets a moving benchmark for
an access right. In practice, this often means identifying preferred custom-
ers--or internal division of its own operations-and ensuring that the
would-be-discriminated against party obtains the same treatment.8 ' In the
AT&T case, the obvious benchmark for access to the local network was to
require that AT&T's long distance competitors obtained "equal access" to
what AT&T received from the local Bell Companies. 82 In AT&T, the anti-
trust court could-and did-rely on a regulatory agency to enforce the
terms of access by requiring the Bell Companies to file tariffs that defined
the access arrangements.83 More recently, the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Kodak approved an injunction that imposed a non-discriminatory access
obligation on Kodak's distribution of parts to independent service organi-
zations that repaired its copiers.84
80. See, e.g., Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990)
("Antitrust courts normally avoid direct price administration, relying on rules and remedies
[such as structural ones] that are easier to administer."). Critics routinely assailed the
AT&T consent decree on this ground. See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Anti-
trust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 36 (2001) (noting the criticism
and the point that "the greater the administrative requirements of a remedy, the greater the
risk that antitrust enforcement converts into expensive and inefficient industrial policy.");
see also Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications
Act: Regulation Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1402 (1999) (discussing this
criticism and defending Judge Greene).
81. Contract law, in enforcing the requirement to deal in good faith, sometimes im-
poses a similar obligation upon firms. See, e.g., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d
609, 614 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.) (discussing implications of good faith effort require-
ment).
82. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 227 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v.
AT&T, Competitive Impact Statement, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7184 (Fed. 17, 1982); see also
Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization
Cases, 80 OR. L. REv. 109, 184 (2001) ("[T]he most important provision of the decree was
a requirement that the Bell companies modify their switching facilities to provide equal ac-
cess to all long-distance competitors, a requirement that the FCC subsequently extended to
the independent local companies.").
83. See United States v. AT&T, Competitive Impact Statement in Conjunction with
Proposed Modification of Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7180 (Feb. 17, 1982) (noting that
the "tariffs remain subject to regulatory jurisdiction").
84. See Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 n. 11
(9th Cir. 1997).
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The Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision underscored the limits of antitrust
remedies by lifting the part of the district court's injunction that imposed,
in addition to a non-discriminatory access requirement, a reasonableness
limitation on the price at which Kodak would license its intellectual prop-
erty under the decree. By imposing a reasonableness limitation, the district
court would have both involved itself in price-setting decisions. In reject-
ing the district court's regulation of pricing, the Ninth Circuit explained
that the non-discrimination provision would avoid this challenge while
limiting Kodak's ability to abuse its market power.
85
CONCLUSION
In rejecting the aggressive reading of Goldwasser, antitrust courts should
follow three principles in applying the Sherman Act to the telecommunica-
tions industry. First, they should not use the Goldwasser doctrine as a form
of backdoor immunity to evaluating the merits of an antitrust action. Sec-
ond, they should appreciate that the domain of antitrust is more focused
than the wide array of duties (and potential remedies) imposed by the Tele-
com Act. Indeed, it is the focused, clearly authorized, and effective nature
of antitrust oversight that makes it so important that antitrust courts not stay
their hand when presented with viable claims of anticompetitive conduct in
the telecommunications industry. Finally, when a plaintiff establishes a
case for liability, courts should consider carefully how to craft a remedy
that coheres with the regulatory regime, avoiding, except for the most ex-
ceptional situations, regulating the price of access.8 6
85. 125 F.3d at 1226 n.19 (explaining concerns related to "direct price regulation").
86. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (lst Cir. 1990) (not-
ing that antitrust courts generally should avoid taking on the role of a "rate-setting regula-
tory agency"); see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65
F.3d 1406, 1412-13 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) ("[T]he antitrust laws are not a price-
control statute or a public-utility or common-carrier rate-regulation statute."); II PHILIP
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 720b, at 207-08 (2d ed. 1996) (argu-
ing that antitrust courts generally avoid direct price regulation because "tribunals lack both
the expertise and the narrow jurisdictional focus necessary to make such regulatory schemes
work").
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